The State of Judiciary: A Corporate Perspective by Thompson, Larry D.
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
4-1-2007
The State of Judiciary: A Corporate Perspective
Larry D. Thompson
University of Georgia School of Law, lthomps@uga.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Larry D. Thompson, The State of Judiciary: A Corporate Perspective , 95 Geo. L.J. 1107 (2007),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1040
The State of the Judiciary: A Corporate Perspective
LARRY D. THOMPSON AND CHARLES J. COOPER*
ABSTRACT
The rule of law depends on highly talented, independent judges who conscien-
tiously strive to ensure that the law is consistently applied in a principled and
predictable manner This Essay addresses two potential threats to judicial indepen-
dence and the rule of law that we believe warrant special attention at this time.
First, inadequate judicial salaries pose a threat to the quality and independence of
the judiciary. Judges' real pay has declined substantially over the past generation,
even as the compensation of other callings within the legal profession has risen
dramatically. This growing disparity in pay has prompted an increasing number of
experienced judges to leave the bench and has discouraged many of our most
talented and experienced lawyers from accepting judicial nomination. Furthermore,
as judicial compensation has declined, judicial appointees have increasingly come
to the bench from the public rather than the private sector This trend likely does not
bode well for a balanced judiciary. We believe that judicial compensation should be
increased substantially at both the federal and state levels.
Second, the central role the jury has come to play in American tort law under-
mines the consistency and predictability that are the hallmarks of the rule of law.
When juries, rather than judges, determine basic issues of liability as opposed to
resolving issues of fact, similarly situated litigants may receive widely varying
results from different juries. In addition, empirical studies indicate that juries treat
corporate defendants differently from similarly situated individual defendants, hold-
ing corporations to a higher standard of care and assessing significantly higher
damages against corporations when they find liability. The direct and indirect costs
of such inconsistent and discriminatory treatment harm not only corporations, but
also employees, shareholders, and consumers. Judges can and should play a greater
role in resolving liability questions in tort disputes in order to restore clarity,
consistency, predictability, and accountability to this area of the law.
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INTRODUCTION
An independent judiciary composed of highly qualified judges who conscien-
tiously uphold the rule of law is of first importance to our constitutional
republic. And, as General Counsel to a Fortune 500 company and the founding
partner of a litigation firm serving major corporate clients, we can attest that
judicial independence and the rule of law are vital to corporate America as well.
In order to conduct their affairs in accordance with law, corporations spend a
great deal of time and money on legal planning. Still, despite their best efforts,
corporations find themselves in court far too often. Whether planning or litigat-
ing, corporations depend on an independent judiciary that will apply the law in
a principled and consistent manner.
Although a judicial system premised on judicial independence and the rule of
law depends on many things, we would like to focus on two requirements of
such a system that warrant special attention at this time. First, our judicial
system requires independent judges "of the first talents"1 who are capable of
resolving difficult issues of law in a responsible and intellectually rigorous
manner. Second, those judges must conscientiously uphold the rule of law by
ensuring that legal disputes are consistently resolved in a principled and predict-
able manner-like cases should be decided alike. With respect to the first
requirement, we believe that inadequate judicial salaries currently pose a threat
to the quality and independence of the judiciary. With respect to the second
requirement, we believe that the central role the jury has come to play in
American tort law undermines the consistency and predictability that are the
hallmarks of the rule of law. Indeed, we are concerned that the inconsistency
and unpredictability that have come to characterize our tort law may be migrat-
1. 2 Tim RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTON OF 1787, at 429 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
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ing to other areas of the law as well. We submit that judicial salaries should be
increased to ensure a highly talented, widely experienced, and independent
judiciary, and the judiciary, in turn, should conscientiously strive to ensure that
tort disputes are resolved in a principled and consistent manner.
I. INCREASING JUDICIAL COMPENSATION TO ENSURE JUDICIAL QUALITY AND
INDEPENDENCE
Last spring Judge J. Michael Luttig resigned from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to take a job as General Counsel for Boeing.
Although he had served as a federal judge for nearly fifteen years, he was only
fifty-one years old.2 In our opinion, Judge Luttig was one of the finest judges of
his generation, and his departure from the federal bench is an immeasurable loss
to the judicial system and the country.
Judge Luttig's resignation illustrates a disturbing trend. As Chief Justice
Roberts indicated in his 2005 year-end report:
Figures gathered by the Administrative Office show that judges are leaving
the bench in greater numbers now than ever before. In the 1960s, only a
handful of district and appellate court judges retired or resigned; since 1990,
92 judges have left the bench. Of those, 21 left before reaching retirement
age. Fifty-nine of them stepped down to enter the private practice of law. In
the past five years alone, 37 judges have left the federal bench-nine of them
in the last year.
3
And a 2003 report prepared by the American Bar Association and the Federal
Bar Association (the "ABA Report") observed that the recent spate of depar-
tures from the bench "is alarming because the number is increasing significantly
(even after factoring in the overall growth of the judiciary) in a profession
where there is an expectation, grounded in the Constitution, of life tenure."4 At
the same time, substantial anecdotal evidence suggests that many of our most
talented and experienced lawyers are unwilling to accept nomination to the
federal courts.5
2. See Editorial, Luttig's Legacy, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2006, at A 16.
3. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2005 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (2006), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2005year-endreport.pdf; see also Harlington Wood,
Jr., "Real Judges, " 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 259, 264 (2001) (noting that "sixty Article III judges
retired or resigned from the bench between 1991 and 2002, marking it as the largest number of
departures in federal judiciary history for any ten-year period").
4. AM. BAR Ass'N & FED. BAR Ass'N, FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY: AN UPDATE ON THE URGENT NEED FOR
ACTION 20 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/documents/2003judpay.pdf [hereinafter
ABA REPORT].
5. See, e.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-23; William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United
States, Judicial Compensation, Statement Before the National Commission on the Public Service (July
15, 2002), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-07-15-02.html.
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In a time of ever increasing caseloads 6 and bitter partisan politicization of the
judicial selection process, there are no doubt many reasons why judges might
choose to leave the bench and why well-qualified lawyers might hesitate to
accept judicial nomination. But it is clear that one significant reason is increas-
ingly inadequate judicial compensation.
A. THE ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE DECLINE IN JUDICIAL COMPENSATION
Although judges have never been highly compensated in this country, federal
district and circuit judges' real pay has declined nearly 24% since 1969.'
Supreme Court Justices have suffered an even greater loss of purchasing
power-more than 37%. 8 By contrast, during this same time, the real pay of the
average American worker has grown more than 15%, 9 the real cost of a house
has increased 42%, and the real cost of a college education has risen some
126%.'O Much of the loss in real pay for judges occurred between 1993 and
2002, a period when Congress repeatedly denied the judiciary (and itself)
annual statutory cost-of-living adjustments; judicial real pay accordingly de-
clined some 9.8%." Not surprisingly, the National Commission on the Public
Service (the "Volcker Commission") concluded in 2003 that "[j]udicial salaries
are the most egregious example of the failure of federal compensation poli-
cies." And however inadequate federal judicial salaries may be, it bears
remembering that state judicial salaries are lower still. State general jurisdiction
trial judges are paid, on average, approximately seventy percent of a federal
district judge's salary, and the average salary for an associate justice of a state
court of last resort is less than two-thirds that of an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court and just over three-fourths that of a federal circuit
judge.13
At the same time that judge's real pay has declined, the salaries of attorneys
in other fields have increased dramatically. Although it is no surprise that the
compensation of partners at major law firms and the in-house counsels of major
6. See ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 18-19 (reporting that from 1969 to 2002, average caseloads
grew 58.4% for district court judges (from 339 to 537 cases per judge) and 211.4% for circuit judges
(from 123 to 383 cases per judge)).
7. See ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 12; ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 4.
8. See ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 12.
9. See ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 4; see also ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 13 (noting a 17.5%
increase in the real pay of the average American worker between 1969 and 2002).
10. See ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
11. See id. at 12; see also id. app. H at 26 (charting cost-of-living adjustment effects on judicial and
congressional salaries since 1993).
12. NAT'L COMMi'N ON PUB. SERV., URGENT BusINEss FOR AMERICA: REvTALIZING THE FEDERAL GOvERN-
MENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 22 (2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu/gs/cps/volcker/
reportfinal.pdf [hereinafter VOLCKER REPORT].




corporations dwarf judicial salaries, 14 many junior or even first-year law firm
associates now earn more than district and appellate court judges, most of
whom were highly experienced lawyers before they joined the bench.1 5 Indeed,
"[t]o exacerbate an already demoralizing situation, some of our Federal judges
report that these high-earning, first-year associates clerked for them the preced-
ing year." 16 Moreover the ABA Report determined in 2003 that the average
salary of a law school dean exceeded that of the Chief Justice of the United
States, while the Volcker Commission found that one year earlier the average
salary of the deans at the top-ranked law schools was more than twice that of a
district judge and that the average earnings of full professors at these schools
significantly exceeded that of any member of the state or federal judiciary.17
B. THE CONSEQUENCES OF DECLINING JUDICIAL PAY
There are good reasons to think that increasingly inadequate judicial compen-
sation plays a significant role in prompting judges to leave the bench. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist observed in testimony before the Volcker Commission:
Although we cannot say that the judges who are leaving the bench are leaving
only because of inadequate pay, many of them have noted that financial
considerations are a big factor. The fact that judges are leaving because of
inadequate pay is underscored by the fact that most of the judges who have
left the bench in the last ten years have entered private practice.
18
Accounts abound of judges who have left the bench at least in part because of
financial considerations. 19 Indeed, Judge Luttig "alluded to his financial situa-
tion in his resignation letter to President Bush, noting his daughter is near
college age and his son 'is following not long behind.' 20 Likewise, administra-
14. See ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 17 ("On average, partners at the major law firms received
compensation in excess of $700,000 and profits ranging from $270,000 to $3,285,000 in 2001. General
counsels of major companies earned cash salaries averaging $445,000 and substantial bonuses in
2000.").
15. See id. at 16-17.
16. Id. at 17; see also Wood, supra note 3, at 264 ("[Jludges often see their law clerks recruited to
leading private firms at starting salaries comparable to those of judges.").
17. See ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 18 ("Nationwide, the average salary of law school deans for
2002-03 was approximately $200,000...."); VOLCKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 23 (summarizing a
study of the salaries of professors and deans at the U.S. News and World Report's top twenty-five law
schools, which found that the deans of these schools made an average of $301,639, and that full
professors at these schools made an average base salary of $209,751, with summer research and
teaching supplements usually ranging between $33,000 and $80,000). By way of contrast, in 2003 the
Chief Justice's salary was raised from $192,600 to $198,600, and the salary of a district judge increased
from $150,000 to $154,700. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Salaries Since 1968,
http://www.uscourts.gov/salarychart.pdf (listing salaries through 2006).
18. Rehnquist, supra note 5.
19. See, e.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 14-15, 27-28.
20. Jess Bravin & J. Lynn Lunsford, Breakdown of Trust Led Judge Luttig to Clash with Bush, WALL
ST. J., May 11, 2006, at Al (quoting Judge Luttig).
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tion officials and others involved in recruiting judicial candidates report that
insufficient compensation is "the single most important factor" deterring poten-
tial candidates from seeking appointment.
2
'
Inadequate judicial pay has troubling consequences for the quality and inde-
pendence of the judiciary. As Chief Justice Roberts has observed, "[e]very time
an experienced judge leaves the bench early, the judiciary suffers a real loss. ' 22
New judges rarely bring to the bench the types of judging and judicial manage-
ment skills that years of judicial experience provide. Because it takes time for
new judges to gain such experience and skills, when an experienced judge
leaves the bench, the nation suffers a temporary, but significant, loss in judicial
productivity.
23
Furthermore, when judicial compensation is so low that many of our most
talented and experienced lawyers are unwilling to accept nomination, there is a
real risk that "the judiciary will over time cease to be made up of a diverse
group of the Nation's very best lawyers.",24 In the memorable words of former
Chief Justice Rehnquist, "Our judges will not continue to represent the diverse
face of America if only the well-to-do or mediocre are willing to become
judges. 25
There is evidence that inadequate judicial salaries may already be changing
the makeup of the judiciary in at least one significant respect. Although the
federal judiciary has traditionally attracted talented and seasoned lawyers with
extensive and successful experience in the private sector,26 the ABA Report
indicates that "[a] review of judicial appointments from 1977 through 2002
indicates a pronounced trend for district court appointees increasingly to come
from the public sector., 2 7 This trend likely does not bode well for a balanced
judiciary in general or for corporate America in particular. As former Chief
Justice Rehnquist recognized, lawyers with extensive experience in the private
sector bring to the bench "a perspective and an independence that is vital to the
judiciary.,2 8 Moreover, it is judges with this experience who are most likely to
have the perspective and expertise to appreciate and understand fully the
practical dimension of legal issues of greatest importance to the shareholders,
employees, and communities that constitute corporate America.29
Inadequate judicial compensation has the potential to compromise not only
21. ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 22; see also id. at 23.
22. ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 5.
23. See Rehnquist, supra note 5.
24. ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 4.
25. Rehnquist, supra note 5.
26. See id.
27. ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 23.
28. Rehnquist, supra note 5; see also ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 23 ("The Federal judiciary
benefits from the collective wealth and expertise of its jurists who have served in different capacities in
the public and private sectors.").
29. Cf ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 4 (predicting that if the judiciary "come[s] to be staffed by a
combination of the independently wealthy and those following a career path before becoming a judge
[Vol. 95:11071112
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judicial quality and diversity, but also judicial independence. As former Chief
Justice Rehnquist has explained:
Inadequate compensation seriously compromises the judicial independence
fostered by life tenure. The prospect that low salaries might force judges to
return to the private sector rather than stay on the bench risks affecting
judicial performance-instead of serving for life, those judges would serve
the terms their finances would allow, and they would worry about what awaits
them when they return to the private sector. John Adams warned in his 1776
pamphlet, "Thoughts on Government," that judges' "minds should not be
distracted with jarring interests; they should not be dependant upon any man,
or body of men."
30
Furthermore, as one prominent judge has observed, persistently inadequate
compensation
leads to the unseemly practice of judges having to implore Congress to restore
fair compensation at the same time those same judges are sitting in review of
congressional enactments and of judges seeking the support in this regard of
the Executive Branch, which also happens to be the principal litigant in the
federal courts. 3
Regardless of whether Article III's prohibition of judicial pay cuts explicitly
applies to the erosion of judges' real pay resulting from inflation, the principle
of judicial independence that this prohibition was intended to preserve is plainly
compromised when Congress fails to maintain adequate judicial compensa-
tion.32
C. JUDICIAL COMPENSATION SHOULD BE INCREASED NOW
From the time of our country's founding, judges have willingly served for
much less than they could make in private undertakings-feeling, perhaps, as
did our third Chief Justice, Oliver Ellsworth, that "[t]ho' our country pays badly,
different from the practicing bar at large[, s]uch a development would dramatically alter the nature of
the federal judiciary").
30. Rehnquist, supra note 5 (quoting John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in 4 THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNrED STATES 193, 198 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston,
Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851)); see also ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 20-21 ("For judges to
emulate the pattern of executive branch Federal service as a mere steppingstone to reentry into private
sector law firm practice is inconsistent with the traditional lifetime calling of Federal judicial service.");
ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 3-4 (expressing concern about life-tenured judges leaving the bench because
of financial considerations).
31. Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., Remarks Before the American Bar Association Commission on
Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence (Dec. 13, 1996), reprinted as Current Threats to
Judicial Independence and Appropriate Responses: A Presentation to the American Bar Association, 12
ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL CoMiMETr. 45, 55 (1996).
32. See id. at 54.
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it is the only one in the world worth working for.",33 As Teddy Roosevelt
recognized, however, "[i]t is not befitting the dignity of the nation that its most
honored public servants should be paid sums so small compared to what they
would earn in private life that the performance of public service by them
implies an exceedingly heavy pecuniary sacrifice."3 4 We agree with the Volcker
Commission's recommendation that Congress should grant "an immediate and
substantial increase in judicial salaries. 3 5 The impact of even a substantial raise
on the federal budget would be "vanishingly small."36 States should likewise
significantly raise judicial pay. To continue to ignore inadequate judicial salaries
could prove costly indeed. In the words of the Volcker Commission:
The lag in judicial salaries has gone on too long, and the potential for
diminished quality in American jurisprudence is now too large. Too many of
America's best lawyers have declined judicial appointments. Too many senior
judges have sought private sector employment-and compensation-rather
than making the important contributions we have long received from judges
in senior status.
Unless this is revised soon, the American people will pay a high price for
the low salaries we impose on the men and women in whom we invest
responsibility for the dispensation of justice.37
II. RESTORING CONSISTENCY AND PREDICTABILITY TO TORT LAW
Although independent, highly qualified judges are the key ingredient of a
well-functioning legal system, it is also necessary that these judges conscien-
tiously uphold the rule of law. This requires that clear legal principles be
faithfully and consistently applied to resolve disputes, and that like cases be
treated alike. As Professor Eugene Rostow once observed, "[t]he basic moral
principle, acknowledged by every legal system we know anything about, is that
33. Letter from Oliver Wolcott (Oct. 16, 1800), in 2 MEMOIRS OF THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHING-
TON AND JOHN ADAMS 434 (George Gibbs ed., New York, William Van Norden 1846), quoted in
Rehnquist, supra note 5.
34. President Theodore Roosevelt, Eighth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1908), in 15 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 7198, 7209 (James D. Richardson ed., n.s.
1913).
35. VOLCKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 32.
36. ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 6. One commentator argued that
judicial salaries make up only a tiny part of the national budget. Had judges received COLA
adjustments in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999... there would have been a 9.40% increase in
judicial salaries. The effect of this salary increase would have accounted for less than
0.00012% of the 2001 [fiscal year] total federal budget, and only about 0.009% of the federal
budget dedicated to the administration of justice.
Kristen A. Holt, Comment, Justice for Judges: The Roadblocks on the Path to Judicial Compensation
Reform, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 513, 542 (2006) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).
37. VOLCKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 23.
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similar cases should be decided alike."38 When the legal system functions in
this way, it is possible for corporations and individuals to structure their affairs
to comply with the law and to avoid liability. Indeed, such predictability is
vitally important to corporate America, where economic planning and stability
are essential to prosperity and success.
Unfortunately, whatever may be the case in other areas of law, clarity,
consistency, and predictability are largely lacking in the law of torts as it is
applied in America today. Although these shortcomings have many causes, a
substantial measure of the blame, we believe, is attributable to excessive
reliance on juries, rather than judges, to determine issues of liability in this area
of the law.
A. THE RISE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE JURY'S PREDOMINANT ROLE IN MODERN
TORT LAW
During the last century, tort law changed dramatically as appellate courts and
legislatures rejected or modified a variety of venerable doctrines that had
shielded defendants from expansive tort liability in a broad range of common
circumstances. As the importance of these doctrines declined or even disap-
peared, tort liability increasingly came to turn on standards, rather than clear
rules, and the application of these standards was generally left to the jury, rather
than the judge. Thus, whatever the merits and effect of these changes in legal
doctrine are as an abstract matter, one significant and, it appears, largely
unintended practical result was to expand the jury's traditional fact-finding role
and, at the same time, to decrease the significance of the judge's role in
determining tort liability.39
As Judge Jerome Frank explained, although "[t]he function of the jury is
supposed to be fact-finding," when the jury determines liability, as it generally
does in the law of torts today, it determines "not the 'facts' but the legal rights
and obligations of the parties to the suit." ° Judge Frank continued:
Jury-made law, as compared with judge-made law, is peculiar in form. It
does not issue general pronouncements. You will not find it set forth in law
reports or in text-books. It does not become embodied in a series of prece-
dents. It is nowhere codified. For each jury makes its own law in each case
with little or no knowledge of or reference to what has been done before or
regard to what will be done thereafter in similar cases.41
38. Philip K. Howard, Making Civil Justice Sane, Crry J., Spring 1968, at 64, 68 (quoting Professor
Rostow).
39. See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common
Law, 68 FoRDHAM L. REv. 407, 421 (1999) (explaining that "the growth of the power of the jury lies in
the shift from rules to standards, a change the legal realists championed" while noting "[t]hat one fruit
borne from the realists' labors is a growth in the power of the jury is ironic, for that was not their
goal").
40. JERoME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 170, 172 (6th prtg. 1949).
41. Id. at 173-74 n.:.
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Nor, in the usual case, need the jury ever publicly justify or explain its decision.
For example, in a typical tort case, the jury offers no reasons or analysis but
simply reaches a general verdict finding the defendant liable or not liable. The
unexplained verdict thus comes into court "as inscrutable and essentially myste-
rious as the judgment which issued from the ancient oracle of Delphi."42
There are significant implications for the rule of law when the jury, rather
than the judge, is asked to determine basic issues of liability. Because jury
verdicts neither create precedents nor establish general principles, "[t]wo liti-
gants with virtually identical fact situations subject to the same standards of law
may receive quite different results from two different juries. 43 Not only is such
inconsistent treatment of similarly situated persons unfair, it "makes unenviable
the task of prediction for those counseling clients on the specific conduct
required by the law or the prospects of going to trial on a particular matter.' 44
Moreover, because juries deliberate in secret and generally need not explain
their verdicts, meaningful review of the jury's decisionmaking process by
appellate courts or the public is often all but impossible.45 Indeed, "[tihe most
unusual characteristic of the jury-and especially the civil jury-is that, in a
regime devoted primarily to the principled rule of law, jurors are intentionally
allowed to make their decisions without requiring that they be justified or
subjected to review, except on grounds of gross error. ', 46
Relatively recent empirical studies raise additional concerns regarding the
dominant role the jury has come to play in the interpretation and application of
tort law. As an initial matter, although the law has long entertained the premise
that "a reasonable jury is presumed to know and understand the law, ' 4 7 a
growing body of empirical studies has uniformly concluded that, whatever their
merits as fact-finding bodies, juries often misunderstand and misapply judges'
instructions regarding the law. 48 Among other things, these studies have shown
42. Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 258 (1920); see also
Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process-The Case for the
Fact Verdict, 59 U. CtN. L. REv. 15, 25 (1990) (stating that where a jury reaches a general verdict with
"no explanation of how the decision was reached," trial by jury "resemble[s] its ancient forbears, trial
by ordeal and by battle, where similarly there was no division between fact and law but only a decision
on the general question").
43. Brodin, supra note 42, at 35-36.
44. Id. at 36; see also FRANK, supra note 40, at 173 n.* ("Surely, if any law is retroactive-
unknowable at the time of action-it is jury law. As long as the jury system flourishes it will be
peculiarly absurd to say that any man warrantably acted with reference to a known state of law.").
45. See Brodin, supra note 42, at 19-20; see also Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L.
REv. 1601, 1603 (2001) (observing that "a general verdict imposing or refusing to impose civil liability
is largely inscrutable and, therefore, often unreviewable in practice").
46. George L. Priest, Justifying the Civil Jury, in VERDicr: AsSssuNo THE CIvn. JURY SYSTEM 103, 105
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
47. E.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 243 (1993).
48. See, e.g., Brodin, supra note 42, at 46-47 (summarizing and citing studies); Neal R. Feigenson,
The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think About Causation, Reasonableness, and




that jurors typically understand fewer than half of the legal instructions they are
given,49 and that jurors err on legal questions twice as frequently as on factual
determinations."0 It has thus been observed:
When we depend on jurors untrained in the law to comprehend legal concepts
provided to them through oral instructions by the judge and further to
properly apply them to the facts as found, we make reliance on such rules in
the conduct of one's daily affairs a matter of questionable wisdom.5'
Moreover, and of special concern to corporate America, careful empirical
research has also demonstrated that-consistent with the anecdotal evidence
with which we are all familiar-juries treat corporate defendants differently
from individual defendants. Thus, although the law provides no basis for such a
distinction, juries hold corporate defendants to a higher standard of care than
individual defendants charged with identical acts, finding corporate defendants
negligent or reckless on the same facts on which individual defendants are
found blameless.5 2 Similarly, when corporate defendants are found liable in tort,
juries assess significantly higher damages than they assess against individual
defendants found liable for inflicting identical or substantially similar injuries.53
For example, one seminal study based on actual jury verdicts predicted that in
the ordinary run of tort cases "corporate defendants pay 34 percent larger
awards, after controlling for plaintiffs' injuries and type of legal case" than do
individual defendants and, in cases of severe physical injury, "a corporate
defendant pays almost 4.5 times as much as an individual, on average. 54
We believe the problems associated with the dominant role that the jury has
come to play in American tort law should be a cause of concern not only to
corporations but to the country as a whole. Indeed, the growth of class actions
and mass litigation has accentuated the harm that can result from even a single
ad hoc and unwarranted jury verdict. 55
As an initial matter, jury verdicts that subject corporate defendants to unpre-
dictable, inconsistent, discriminatory, and often practically unreviewable liabil-
49. See Feigenson, supra note 48, at 66 n.9.
50. See Brodin, supra note 42, at 46-47.
51. Id. at 37.
52. See Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of Corporate Defendants,
48 DEPAUL L. REv. 327, 338-39, 343, 344-45, 348-49 (1998) (summarizing results of analyses of jury
verdicts and awards, judge-jury agreement for verdicts, and experimental studies); Robert J. MacCoun,
Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the "Deep-Pockets"
Hypothesis, 30 LAW & Soc'v REV. 121, 126 (1996) ("Both archival analyses and mock jury experimenta-
tion indicate that in similar cases, juries do treat corporations differently from individuals."); Noah,
supra note 45, at 1642 & n. 155 (summarizing research that juries hold corporate defendants to a higher
standard than individual defendants).
53. See, e.g., Hans, supra note 52, at 338-39, 344-45 (summarizing results of jury award analyses
and experimental studies in which corporate defendants were continually made to pay higher awards).
54. James K. Hammitt et al., Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL STuD. 751, 754 (1985).
55. See Gergen, supra note 39, at 422.
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ity are fundamentally unfair. The mere possibility of such verdicts, moreover,
creates uncertainty for those seeking to comply with the law and generates
wasteful litigation. The costs of litigation and the possibility of such verdicts, in
turn, can intimidate businesses into assuming a defensive posture, chilling
productive and socially desirable activities that carry unavoidable risks, such as
the development and marketing of new products and services. Indeed, "[t]here
can be no doubt that the cumulative effect of jury verdicts in areas such as
products liability and medical malpractice is tantamount to the making of social
policy, influencing, if not directing, the future conduct of manufacturers, drug
companies, and hospitals. 56
The direct costs that such verdicts impose on business harm not only corpora-
tions, but also employees and the nearly 100 million American investors who
own corporate stock, either directly or through mutual funds or retirement
plans.57 Such costs also harm consumers, who ultimately foot the bill for such
verdicts through increased prices that effectively include what has been called a
"lawsuit tax" of between $3000 and $4000 a year for a family of four.58
Large though these direct costs may be, the indirect costs may be more
significant still. When fear of unjustified jury verdicts causes corporations to
withdraw products or services from the market or to delay or terminate the
development of new products or services, consumers lose the benefits that these
products or services might have provided. For example, during the early 1980s,
a rash of unjustified litigation alleged-despite the lack of sound scientific
evidence-that Bendectin, a medication for morning sickness, caused limb
reduction birth defects. Although judges uniformly found in favor of the defen-
dant in cases that were tried without a jury, a substantial percentage (43%) of
the jury trials resulted in verdicts for the plaintiffs. 59 Even though all of the
verdicts for the plaintiffs were ultimately reversed or vacated, the damage had
already been done. High litigation costs had led Merrell Dow to withdraw
Bendectin from the market and this medication, which the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) continues to regard as safe and effective, is no longer
available even though it served a valuable and beneficial therapeutic role for
56. Brodin, supra note 42, at 105-06; see also id. at 37 (discussing a study which concluded "that of
the variety of external pressures felt by large manufacturers with regard to the safe design of their
products, liability litigation had the greatest influence on design decisions, but that the signals sent by
jury verdicts were extremely vague" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Noah, supra note 45, at 1650
(observing that "even if they set no precedent, civil verdicts have an undoubted regulatory effect"); cf.
Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing
Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VANDo. L. REV. 901, 935 (2001) (observing that "business and
corporate entities... are more likely than individuals to consciously weigh the advantages of precau-
tions against the disadvantages").
57. See Steven B. Hantler, Chairman, Am. Justice P'Ship, Tort Reform: Common Sense and
Common Law, Address at the West Virginia Chamber of Commerce (Sept. 2, 2005), in 71 VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY 714, 716 (2005) (noting the large expenses that tort cases impose on businesses,
small investors, and workers).
58. Id. at 717.
59. See Noah, supra note 45, at 1612 n.31.
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many patients. 60 And no doubt "other pharmaceutical companies have gotten
the clear message that marketing any drugs for the treatment of conditions
during pregnancy will attract tort litigation because some juries will not overly
concern themselves with questions of causation.' More generally, "a lawsuit
culture... corrodes daily relations throughout society[,] ... infecting daily deal-
ings with distrust and defensiveness. 62 In the words of former Attorney Gen-
eral Benjamin Civiletti:
Today innocent or near blameless defendants are too frequently put at the
mercy of happenstance and the vagaries and passions of the jurors. The
aberrations that plague current tort litigation not only disappoint the parties
involved, but also impose a tremendous, unpredictable, and unnecessary cost
on litigants and nonlitigants alike.63
B. RESTORING JUDICIAL CONTROL AND THE RULE OF LAW
This unfortunate state of affairs is not inevitable. Judges can and should take
measures to restore clarity, consistency, predictability, and accountability to this
area of the law.
As an initial matter, we believe that, when possible, judges should attempt to
develop and enforce clear rules or at least more specific standards of tort
liability. As Justice Holmes observed long ago:
If, now, the ordinary liabilities in tort arise from failure to comply with
fixed and uniform standards of external conduct, which every man is pre-
sumed and required to know, it is obvious that it ought to be possible, sooner
or later, to formulate these standards at least to some extent, and that to do so
must at last be the business of the court.64
For example, in the law of negligence, which remains of critical importance in
tort law today, "the featureless generality, that the defendant was bound to use
such care as a prudent man would do under the circumstances, ought to be
continually giving place to the specific one, that he was bound to use this or that
precaution under these or those circumstances. 6 5 Justice Holmes's view of tort
law fell decisively out of fashion during the twentieth century. But although his
view may be more aspirational than practical in a broad run of cases today, there
is nevertheless substantial room for the development of more specific rules and
60. See id. at 1656-57.
61. Id. at 1657; see also Brodin, supra note 42, at 106 n.409 (noting "the withdrawal of an effective
anti-pertussis vaccine after several large jury verdicts against the pharmaceutical producers").
62. Howard, supra note 38, at 64.
63. Benjamin R. Civiletti, Zeroing in on the Real Litigation Crisis: Irrational Justice, Needless
Delays, Excessive Costs, 46 MD. L. REV. 40, 40 (1986).
64. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 111 (Little, Brown & Co. 1938) (1881).
65. Id.
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standards in tort law.6 6 For example, we believe that in many circumstances and
contexts, compliance with safety regulations or industry customs should consti-
tute a defense to tort liability as a matter of law, and that courts should
reconsider or at least limit the prevailing contrary doctrine.67
When judges cannot resolve liability on the basis of clear rules, they should
carefully review the sufficiency of plaintiffs' evidence to ensure that meritless
cases are not submitted to the jury. The revitalization in recent years of
summary judgment-which allows judges to keep claims that plainly lack
evidentiary support from the jury-is a welcome development,68 and courts
should use this and other tools, such as dismissals and judgments as a matter of
law, vigorously to help restore principled decisionmaking to the tort system.
Even when broad issues such as negligence must be submitted to the jury,
judges can and should attempt to guide the jury's deliberation so as to promote
fair and predictable application of the law. For example, the so-called Hand
Formula, which makes clear "that negligence means creating an 'unreasonable
risk,' defined as one whose expected costs exceed the costs of avoiding it, has
been explicitly endorsed by the Restatement of Torts, by the leading treatises,
and by courts in most states."6 9 Yet courts do not ordinarily instruct juries to
compare the costs and benefits of greater care, but rather simply ask "whether
the actor behaved as 'a reasonably prudent person' would have under the
circumstances. 7 °
The failure to give a more accurate and complete account of the meaning of
negligence likely results primarily from judicial abdication or inertia, and may
66. See Simons, supra note 56, at 934-35 ("Negligence doctrine will and should continue to develop
more specific standards in particular fields. The conventional wisdom that negligence rules normally
cannot be articulated beyond the facts of a given case is wrong; negligence doctrine is full of special
rules and standards. Although rigid, bright-line rules are often inadvisable, more flexible rules and
standards are often both feasible and desirable." (footnote omitted)).
67. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. Cm. L.
REV. 571, 612-13 (1998) ("The refusal to rely more heavily on either regulatory compliance or custom
presents a lost opportunity to avoid a biased assessment of liability, especially in the case of custom.");
Simons, supra note 56, at 935 ("Precedent, related statutory rules, and customary norms should also
play a role in limiting the open-ended quality of negligence judgments.").
68. See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) ("Summary judgment proce-
dure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the
Federal Rules...."); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 254 (1986) (holding that to
survive summary judgment, "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff' and that "the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden"); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(holding that if the factual context renders the plaintiff's claim implausible, the plaintiff must offer
more persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to survive summary judgment).
69. Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REv. 1015, 1015-16 (1994) (footnotes
omitted).
70. Id. at 1017; see also id. at 1019 (explaining that in most cases "the reasonable person standard is
given to the jury without elaboration"); id. at 1022-23 ("An accurate account of existing practices must
therefore begin with the observation that modem negligence law endorses both the Hand Formula and




as a practical matter facilitate juries' application of an improper standard of
liability akin to strict liability in which a defendant is liable unless avoiding any
risk is so costly as to be impractical.7" Although a complicated or technical
cost-benefit instruction might confuse the jury, it is difficult to see a downside to
supplementing a "reasonably prudent person" instruction with an explanation
(which captures the essence of the Hand Formula in a simple and intuitive
manner) that such a person exercises such care as "an average reasonable
person takes of his or her own person and property," perhaps coupled with an
instruction that the Hand Formula should be applied "as a nontechnical rule of
thumb."7 2 Invoking the Hand Formula would make clear that the jury should
consider only the risk of injury and the costs and benefits of additional care, not
such legally irrelevant considerations as the defendant's corporate status or
sympathy for the plaintiff's injuries.7 3 Doing so would also indicate to the jury
that when the costs of prevention are disproportionately high, actors engaged in
beneficial activities may create reasonable, albeit foreseeable, risks without
liability.7
4
In addition, when courts must submit broad issues of liability to the jury, they
should avoid asking the jury to deliver a general verdict that simply reports
whether the jury found the defendant liable and, if it did, the amount, of
damages deemed appropriate by the jury. Rather, courts can and should make
use of special verdicts or similar procedural devices that require the jury to
specifically state how it resolved each of the disputed issues of fact, liability,
and damages at issue in the case. By packaging the litigation into manageable
components and focusing the jury's attention on key disputed issues, procedural
devices such as special verdicts serve "to structure the jury's deliberations in a
manner that highlights the judge's instructions. 75 More importantly, such
devices promote accountability and meaningful review of the jury's decision by
"enabl[ing] the public, the parties and the court to see what the jury has really
done."76 Although special verdicts and similar procedures have become more
71. See id. at 1025-26, 1052.
72. Id. at 1037, 1042.
73. See id. at 1044.
74. Id.
75. Brodin, supra note 42, at 64-65; see also id. at 63 (explaining that special verdicts and
interrogatories "operate to improve the reliability of jury decision-making through the recognized
psychological impact specific questions have in concentrating juror attention on certain matters to the
exclusion of others").
76. Sunderland, supra note 42, at 259. Judge Hand elaborated on the value of procedural devices
such as the special verdict:
I also concur in thinking that it would be desirable to take special verdicts more often. True, it
would often expose the general verdict to defeat by showing how irrational had been the
operation of the juror's minds. However, like my brother Frank, I am not among those who
appear to esteem the system just because it gives rein to the passional element of our nature,
however inevitably that may enter all our conclusions. I should like to subject a verdict, as
narrowly as was practical, to a review which should make it in fact, what we very elaborately
pretend that it should be: a decision based upon law.
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common in recent years,7 7 increased use of these devices would foster clarity,
consistency, and accountability in the tort system.
More fundamentally, the current state of the tort system may even warrant
reexamination of the view that the application of liability standards, such as
negligence, is a question of fact for the jury rather than one of law for the
judge.78 As some of our most eminent judges and scholars have recognized,
even a highly fact-dependent standard of liability, such as the reasonably
prudent care standard of negligence, remains at bottom a legal standard. 79 And
special verdicts would seem tailor-made to assign the responsibility for determin-
ing historic facts to the jury, while reserving to the judge the application of legal
standards of liability to those facts. Indeed, some of the most forceful advocates
for the special verdict have contemplated just such a role for this procedural
mechanism, even referring to such a verdict as a "fact verdict. '' 80 In the words
of one such advocate:
By confining the civil jurors' role to the facts and leaving law application to
the judge, the fact verdict draws upon the strengths of each. In addition, jurors
who are aware that their specific findings will be publicly recorded will be
encouraged to focus impartially on those issues and to be accurate in their
resolution of them.... Equally important, judges will no longer be able to
pass the buck to the jury on so many of the most challenging and perplexing
problems of modem law. Rather, those questions will have to be answered in
publicly accessible written decisions by resort to evolving standards of con-
duct. 81
Resolving issues of tort liability in this manner would promote principled
decisionmaking and more consistency in application of the rule of law. Al-
though it would be naive to think that judges would be immune from making
bad rulings, "at least the rulings [would] be in writing for all to see and [could]
be appealed and, if [wrong], overturned by the legislature., 82 Moreover, as
precedents accumulate, it seems likely, as Justice Holmes envisioned, that clear
rules or at least more specific legal standards could be identified through the
method of the common law. But even if the search for such rules and standards
Skidmore v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 70 (2d Cir. 1948) (Hand, J., concurring); see also
Brodin, supra note 42, at 69 ("By breaking down and spelling out the results of the jury's deliberations,
the special verdict makes review more meaningful and effective."); Noah, supra note 45, at 1653
(suggesting that "the increased use of special verdict forms or general verdicts with interrogatories
could enhance the transparency of the jury's decisionmaking process").
77. See Brodin, supra note 42, at 62, 94.
78. See, e.g., Richmond & Danville R.R. Co. v. Powers, 149 U.S. 43, 45 (1893); R.R. Co. v. Stout,
84 U.S. (17 Wail.) 657, 663-65 (1874).
79. See, e.g., Skidmore, 167 F.2d at 67; HoLMEs, supra note 64, at 110-11, 123-24.
80. E.g., Skidmore, 167 F.2d at 57-70. See generally Brodin, supra note 42, at 50 n.149 (collecting
commentary).
81. Brodin, supra note 42, at 110-11.
82. Howard, supra note 38, at 73.
1122 [Vol. 95:1107
A CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE
proved ultimately futile, a body of written precedents would at least provide by
analogy a measure of coherence and predictability that is currently lacking from
this area of the law. By contrast, "having no rulings"-as happens when issues
of liability are decided by a jury in ad hoc, inconsistent, unpredictable, and
largely unreviewable general verdicts-"is like having a perfect record of bad
rulings. Most people will act as if they might be liable. Why take the risk?
' 8 3
C. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT BAR REFORM
Some argue, however, that the Seventh Amendment bars federal judges from
taking the application of tort liability standards, such as negligence, from the
jury.8 4 We do not believe that it does. 5
The Seventh Amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
86
Consistent with the textual requirement that the jury right "be preserved," the
Supreme Court has consistently analyzed the Seventh Amendment's meaning in
light of the historical jury right that existed at common law when the Amend-
ment was adopted. 7
Tort concepts like negligence were not yet developed at the time the Seventh
Amendment was adopted, however.8 Indeed, as Professor Lawrence Friedman
has explained, the law of torts as a whole was "totally insignificant" at that time,
"a twig on the great tree of law.",89 And the general negligence duty to take
reasonable care in conduct that might foreseeably harm other people or their
property appears not to have been clearly formulated until long after the
Seventh Amendment was adopted. 90 Furthermore, the most closely analogous
questions that did exist at the time of the Seventh Amendment's adoption, such
as the reasonableness of notice in commercial cases and the existence of
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Int'l Terminal Operating Co. v. N.V. Nederl. Amerk Stoomv. Maats., 393 U.S. 74, 75
(1968) (per curiam) (asserting cursorily that the Seventh Amendment requires that the determination of
contributory negligence be left to the jury's determination).
85. Although we do not consider the questions posed by analogous state civil jury provisions, to the
extent those provisions are interpreted consistent with the Seventh Amendment our analysis of the latter
provision would likely be relevant or controlling in the state constitutional context as well.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
87. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996).
88. See Brodin, supra note 42, at 32 n.73.
89. LAWRFNCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIsTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467 (2d ed. 1985).
90. See Gergen, supra note 39, at 429-30 & n.107 (suggesting that Heaven v. Pender, (1883) 111
Q.B.D. 503 (C.A.) (Eng.), "is the original expression of this principle"); see also Stephen A. Weiner,
The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. RaV. 1867, 1891 (1966) (tracing this
principle to Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.)).
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probable cause in malicious prosecution actions, were treated as legal questions
that could be decided by the judge.9' It would thus appear that "from a strict
historical test.., there is no federal constitutional right to have a jury apply the
reasonable man standard.,
92
More generally, special verdicts and other formal and informal mechanisms
existed at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted and allowed judges to
control the application of legal standards to facts determined by the jury.93 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Seventh Amendment to permit modem
analogs of these procedures so long as "[t]hey do not trespass on the prerogative
of the jury to determine all questions of fact.",94 And, as discussed above, a
determination of liability, even under a context-dependent standard such as
reasonableness, is, ultimately, a question of law.95 Significantly, questions of
reasonableness and similar concepts are often decided by judges as legal
questions in many areas of the law, including, notably, commercial law and
Fourth Amendment law.9 6 Indeed, Justice Scalia has stated that he "frankly
91. See, e.g., Tindal v. Brown, (1786) 99 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B.) (holding that what notice is
reasonable in commercial cases is a legal issue and granting judgment for the defendant on the facts
found by the jury pursuant to a special verdict); Weiner, supra note 90, at 1916 (noting that in malicious
prosecution cases, probable cause was a legal question that could be decided by the judge); see also id.
at 1891-92 ("As to other questions of reasonableness in the pre-1791 common law to which this
negligence issue 'could be analogized,' it should be noted that such questions were at the time generally
deemed to be for the court rather than for the jury." (quoting Martin v. Detroit Marine Terminals, Inc.,
189 F. Supp. 579, 583 (E.D. Mich. 1960)).
92. Weiner, supra note 90, at 1891.
93. At common law,
it was not infrequent to ask from the jury a special, rather than a general verdict; that is,
instead of a verdict for or against the plaintiff or defendant, embodying in a single declaration
the whole conclusion of the trial, one which found specially upon the various facts in issue,
leaving to the court the subsequent duty of determining upon such facts the relief which the
law awarded to the respective parties.
Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1897); see, e.g., Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3
Dal].) 365 (1797) (hearing an appeal from a case decided on a special verdict); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3
COMMENTARIES *377 (describing a special verdict, wherein the members of the jury "state the naked
facts, as they find them to be proved, and pray the advice of the court thereon"); THE FEDERAtUST No. 65,
at 361 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 2002) (recognizing that juries "are sometimes induced to
find special verdicts, which refer the main question to the decision of the court"); see also Skidmore v.
Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1948) ("Those who resent any reform which invades
the jury's province should be reassured by the historians who teach that the special verdict is no
new-fangled idea, but one almost as old as the jury itself, older indeed than the modem jury.").
94. Walker, 165 U.S. at 595-98 (rejecting a Seventh Amendment challenge to a statutory procedure
that allowed a judge to disregard the jury's general verdict and enter judgment on the jury's special
findings of fact).
95. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Brodin, supra note 42, at 33 n.77 (explaining that "the issue of reasonable time in
commercial law cases or of what constitutes probable cause in malicious prosecution actions ... are
often left for the judge"); Gergen, supra note 39, at 416 ("[Jludges decide whether there was a
reasonable basis for bringing a lawsuit in the area of abuse of process .... ); Howard, supra note 38, at
69 (noting that "core concepts" in commercial law are often decided as a matter of law); see also
Gergen, supra note 39, at 412 ("If juries were to play the same role in defining what conduct constitutes
fair dealing, improper interference, or unjust enrichment that they historically they [sic] have played in
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do[es] not know" how to answer to the question, "[w]hy should the question
whether a person exercised reasonable care be a question of fact, but the
question whether a search or seizure was reasonable be a question of law?",97 In
light of the historical record, we would submit that no such distinction is
compelled by the Constitution, and that judges may determine the application of
tort liability standards so long as they preserve to the jury the role of determin-
ing historical fact.
CONCLUSION
An independent judiciary composed of highly talented judges who ensure
that the law is consistently applied in a principled and predictable manner is of
vital importance to corporate America and to our constitutional republic. As a
nation, we owe it to the judiciary and ourselves to ensure that judicial compensa-
tion is adequate to attract and retain judges who are independent and capable of
resolving cases in a conscientious and intellectually rigorous manner. In turn,
the judiciary must conscientiously uphold the rule of law by ensuring that like
cases are treated alike and that legal disputes are resolved in a principled and
predictable manner. Increased judicial salaries and an expanded role for judges
in resolving tort disputes would go a long way towards improving the administra-
tion of justice, ensuring judicial independence, and promoting the rule of law.
defining what is inappropriate conduct in negligence the consequences would be profound. The power
to define the legal morality of the marketplace would thereby be shifted from the judge to the jury.").
97. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. Rev. 1175, 1181-82 (1989).
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